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Extensive research in economics explores generosity in monetary allocations. However, 
generosity often involves the allocation of non-monetary goods or experiences. Existing 
evidence suggests that generosity may be higher in such contexts, though no direct comparison 
exists. Here, we compare generosity in decisions that vary whether allocations are monetary or 
non-monetary. In two experiments, generosity is significantly higher in non-monetary contexts. 
Thus, the typical monetary laboratory dictator game may underestimate generosity in many non-
laboratory contexts where allocations are non-monetary. We find weaker relationships between 
individuals’ allocation decisions across monetary and non-monetary contexts than for allocations 
that hold constant the monetary nature of the context.  
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I. Introduction 
Considerable research in economics seeks to understand when and why individuals 
engage in costly, other-regarding behavior (see, for example, Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Andreoni 
and Miller, 2002; Benabou and Tirole, 2006; Ellingsen and Johannesson, 2011). Much of this 
research examines the extent to which people are willing to share money with others, often 
studying behavior in laboratory dictator games (Forsythe, et al., 1994; Frey and Bohnet, 1995; 
Andreoni and Vesterlund, 2001) and in natural settings such as charitable donations (Falk, 2007; 
Karlan and List, 2007; DellaVigna, List and Malmendier, 2012). The focus on sharing money is 
understandable, as monetary donations constitute an economically significant and easily 
measurable example of other-regarding behavior.1  
While the sharing of monetary wealth constitutes an appropriate focus for economic 
research on generosity, it is nevertheless surprising that alternative forms of costly other-
regarding behavior have been relatively neglected in economics. One regularly observes costly 
generous behavior in non-monetary contexts. For example, individuals often incur or risk harm 
in order to lessen the harm to others. Consider two extreme examples: Moira Smith, a New York 
City policewoman, lost her life after running back into the World Trade Center on September 11, 
2001 to rescue others; Irena Sendler risked her life, and was ultimately tortured for, helping 
Jewish children escape the Nazis during World War II. Moreover, such high degrees of 
generosity, whereby people incur significant risk or harm in order to help others, may in fact be 
common in life-and-death situations (Fischhoff, 2005; Frey, Savage, and Torgler, 2011). People 
also regularly voluntarily endure the certain harm of blood, organ, and bone marrow donations in 
order to reduce the harm to others—in the United States alone, about 6,000 organ donations per 
year come from living donors (OrganDonor.gov, 2014). In more routine examples, workers in 
firms and neighbors in communities regularly spend considerable time voluntarily helping one 
another. Hence, given the frequency and consequences of decisions involving non-monetary 
generosity, both heroic and mundane, it is surprising that other-regarding behavior in these 
domains has not been more widely investigated by economists.2  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 In 2013, for example, 1.4 billion people around the world reported donating money to a charity (Charities Aid 
Foundation, 2014). In the United States, total 2013 charitable donations have been estimated at $335 billion, or 
$2,974 per household and roughly 2 percent of GDP (Giving USA, 2014). 
2	  A	  large	  part	  of	  the existing related economic literature studies the relationships between donating money and 
volunteering time, and particularly the extent to which the two are substitutes or complements (Brown and 
Lankford, 1992; Duncan, 1999; Andreoni, 2006).	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Some psychology experiments also document high levels of personal sacrifice for the 
welfare of others in non-monetary contexts (Batson, et al. 1981, 1983 and 1988; Toi and Batson, 
1982; Schaller and Cialdini, 1988; Hein, et al., 2010). In these experiments, a majority of 
subjects often volunteers to incur significant costs to help another person in need. For example, 
Batson, et al. (1983), conduct a study in which subjects are given the opportunity of volunteering 
to accept electric shocks intended for another purported subject—in reality, an experimental 
confederate. In the first experiment reported in the paper, 64 percent of subjects across all 
experimental conditions volunteer to take shocks intended for the victim, and this proportion is 
86 percent in two conditions in which a questionnaire manipulates the perceived similarity 
between the subject and the fictitious victim. In another study (Toi and Batson, 1982), the 
proportion of student subjects volunteering to give up their time to help another student who has 
(purportedly) suffered a serious accident and fallen behind on schoolwork is above 70 percent in 
three of four experimental conditions. In comparison with typically more modest rates of 
generosity in experimental monetary dictator games, these proportions appear high and raise the 
possibility that people may be more generous in contexts involving sharing the burden of non-
monetary harm. However, the degrees of generosity in these very different types of contexts are 
hard to compare, since there are many important reasons why they may differ.3  
To better understand the relationship between generosity in different contexts, we 
conduct laboratory experiments that vary the medium over which allocation choices are made. In 
particular, we compare generosity in monetary allocation contexts—i.e., the standard dictator 
game—with generosity in contexts involving non-monetary allocations such as the distribution 
of physical discomfort. There are many dimensions along which allocation contexts may vary, as 
is evident when comparing any of the above non-monetary choice contexts with monetary 
dictator games. This is also true when comparing households’ monetary charitable donations 
with their volunteering of time (Brown and Lankford, 1992; Duncan, 1999). Instead of 
comparing across natural contexts that vary in multiple dimensions, our goal is to compare 
monetary and non-monetary allocation decisions while keeping constant as many features as 
possible—including the beneficiaries of generous acts, choice environments and procedures, and 
the significance of the stakes—in order to understand whether the domain over which allocations 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 For example, in the above studies, the design often attempts to create the impression that the cost of helping is 
lower than the benefit for the victim. Moreover, the use of deception in these kinds of studies in psychology means 
that subjects’ costly generous acts are not ultimately implemented. 
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are made affects the degrees of observed generosity. We therefore study sharing in a laboratory 
environment, where we can control most features of the decision context, while varying one 
aspect of the context at a time.   
We begin, in Experiment 1, by comparing the standard (monetary) dictator game to a 
situation where the dictator may choose to incur a non-monetary harm in order to mitigate a 
similar harm to another person. Specifically, the non-monetary allocation in our first study 
involves subjects distributing time spent with one’s hand immersed in ice water—an unpleasant 
and painful experience. We choose this comparison for our initial study because the non-
monetary allocation task shares properties with many of the contexts described above, in which 
one person decides how much of a non-monetary physical harm or discomfort to share with 
others. Our findings confirm a substantial difference in generosity between the two contexts. 
Dictators take on a much larger share of the painful experience—on average, 50 percent more—
than the proportion of money they share. Moreover, our within-subject design allows us to 
compare each individual’s generosity across the two contexts; we find that significantly more 
people exhibit greater generosity in the non-monetary harm context than in the monetary one.  
While Experiment 1 serves as a valuable starting point for studying how generosity varies 
across contexts, it leaves many important issues unanswered. In particular, the harm allocation 
potentially differs from a monetary dictator game in several ways beyond the monetary vs. non-
monetary medium over which allocations are made. For example, the two kinds of decisions 
differ in whether the allocation involves a positive windfall gain (in the monetary dictator game) 
or a negative experience in the harm allocation task. Additionally, one allocation is over a highly 
familiar resource (money) and the other over a very unusual one (time spent with a hand 
immersed in ice water). Aside from mere familiarity, the nature of preferences and beliefs might 
differ substantially. For instance, utility from small increases in wealth levels may be more linear 
than disutility from spending additional seconds with one’s hand immersed in ice water, or 
subjects may believe that the costs of different units of harm differ between the dictator and the 
recipient. Any of these possibilities may account for why people behave differently in the two 
contexts. 
Experiment 2 addresses the above potential confounds, to more carefully understand how 
generosity changes between monetary and non-monetary contexts. For this study, we change the 
non-monetary context to one in which subjects allocate time spent doing a boring, tedious task. 
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Time is a particularly appropriate medium for comparisons with money for several reasons, 
making the comparison in our second experiment clearer than the more exploratory one in 
Experiment 1. First, allocating one’s time is as ubiquitous in daily life as is money, with 
individuals regularly confronted with scarcity in both. Second, and relatedly, people regularly 
engage in tradeoffs between time and money, and these are often well understood, linear, and 
similar for large groups of people.4 For instance, most subjects participating in laboratory 
experiments are already engaging in tradeoffs between money and time with implicit hourly 
rates. Third, we can easily manipulate the context to frame both as positive (increases in money 
or free time) or negative (losses of money or free time) allocations, which is important for 
understanding the relative importance of monetary vs. non-monetary and positive vs. negative 
features of the context, which vary simultaneously in our first experiment. Using this cleaner 
design, we confirm the main findings from Experiment 1. Most importantly, participants in our 
experiment are more generous in decisions involving time than in those involving money, and 
this monetary vs. non-monetary dimension is much more important for determining generosity 
than whether a decision involves a gain or loss relative to a status quo. 
By using within-subjects designs, our experiments also allow us to explore relationships 
between how generous individuals are in monetary and non-monetary domains. Surprisingly, we 
find only weak relationships between how generous an individual is in monetary and non-
monetary contexts. Hence, observing an individual acting generously in a monetary allocation 
context may provide very little information about how generous that individual will be in 
another, non-monetary context. Moreover, a single social preference type may be unable to 
account for changes in individuals’ generosity across contexts. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. The next section describes the basic 
framework we will use for testing generosity across contexts, and presents our research questions 
and hypotheses. Sections III and IV present the designs and results of Experiments 1 and 2, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 A few existing studies investigate social preferences in contexts involving time allocation. However, none make 
the comparison at the center of our paper, between generosity in monetary and non-monetary contexts. Like us, 
Noussair and Stoop (2012) use a dictator game in which participants make choices that affect the time at which they 
and their paired partner may leave the experiment. In a related study by Danilov and Vogelsang (2014), dictators can 
spend time executing a tedious task in order to increase the earnings of receivers. Consistent with our central 
hypothesis, participants in these studies are more generous than in other dictator game studies that use money as the 
reward medium, though this requires making comparisons across studies and populations. Other experiments study 
strategic games, such as ultimatum games and public good games, in which part of the outcome payoffs are in 
waiting time (Ellingsen and Johanesson, 2009; Berger et al., 2012; Neugebauer and Traub, 2012). These studies 
generally find (weakly) more pro-social behavior in contexts involving time than those involving money. 
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respectively. Section V discusses and provides an interpretation for the combined results, and 
Section VI concludes. 
 
II. Research Questions and Hypotheses 
Our research focuses on two principal questions. First, does the degree of generosity in 
individual behavior vary across allocation contexts? Our design employs a very simple dictator-
game context, in which strategic considerations and beliefs about others’ actions are irrelevant. 
Hence, the only decision facing subjects is how much of something desirable or something 
undesirable they take for themselves and how much they give to another subject.  
Specifically, assume that ∆𝑤 represents an aggregate change in wealth, or well being 
along a measurable dimension, for a pair of individuals, 𝐴 and 𝐵. The dictator, 𝐴, chooses a 
share, 𝑠! ∈ 0,1 , of the wealth change for herself, thereby imposing the remaining share, 𝑠! = 1− 𝑠!, on 𝐵. Let 𝑣!(𝑠,∆𝑤) represent 𝐴’s personal value from share 𝑠 = 𝑠! of wealth 
change ∆𝑤 and define 𝑣!(𝑠,∆𝑤), when 𝑠 = 𝑠!, similarly for 𝐵. Assume that identical marginal 
wealth changes are equally valuable to both individuals over all possible share allocations; i.e., 𝑣! 𝑠,∆𝑤 = 𝑣!(𝑠,∆𝑤), for all 𝑠. This assumption is satisfied, implicitly, in symmetric monetary 
dictator games where there is no reason to believe that one subject values a given change in 
wealth more than the other. In such a context, we denote the dictator’s generosity as 𝑔 = 1− 𝑠! 
whenever ∆𝑤 > 0, as in the standard dictator game, and as 𝑔 = 𝑠! whenever ∆𝑤 < 0. That is, a 
dictator is generous when sharing more of a positive change, like an increase in wealth, and 
when taking on a greater share of some negative change in outcomes. Following from the 
definition of 𝑔, let 𝑠! 𝑔,∆𝑤  and 𝑠! 𝑔,∆𝑤  be, respectively, the shares that a dictator allocates 
to herself and to the recipient in context ∆𝑤 in order to exhibit generosity 𝑔.  
Finally, consider two such allocation decisions, over two different types of changes, ∆𝑤′ 
and ∆𝑤!!, and assume that outcomes produced by identical degrees of generosity exhibited by 
the dictator are equally valued by each individual in both contexts—i.e., 𝑣! 𝑠!(𝑔,∆𝑤′),∆𝑤′ =𝑣! 𝑠!(𝑔,∆𝑤′′),∆𝑤′′ , for 𝑖 = 𝐴,𝐵 and for all 𝑔. That is, the two dictator-game contexts are 
identical in terms of the value individuals place on what is being allocated. Given that this 
condition is satisfied, any social preference model that starts from players’ personal valuations 
over outcomes (i.e., outcome-based models that treat 𝑣! and 𝑣! as individual payoffs) will 
predict the same degrees of generosity in the two contexts (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and 
	   6 
Ockenfels, 2000).5 Moreover, given the equality of actions and valuations in the two contexts—
and, hence, of the inferences about types and preferences that can be drawn about actions—
social signaling models also yield similar predictions for the two choice contexts (Benabou and 
Tirole, 2006). The point is that—as long as the two dictator games are identical in terms of the 
valuations of the outcomes—then social preference models will make identical predictions for 
the two environments. Hence, our experiments test the null hypothesis, based on social 
preference models, that simply changing the context over which allocations are made, without 
other substantive changes to valuations, should yield no effect on behavior.  
H0: Generosity will not differ across comparable contexts. 
Our primary objective is to compare generosity in monetary and non-monetary contexts. 
As we note in the introduction, evidence from natural settings and psychology experiments 
provide a speculative indication that generosity may be higher in non-monetary contexts. This is 
further supported by evidence that money may exert a detrimental influence on human pro-social 
behavior (Pfeffer and DeVoe, 2009; Ellingsen and Johanneson, 2009; Mogilner, 2010; 
Gasiorowska and Helka, 2012). For example, Vohs, Mead and Goode (2006) found that priming 
participants with money (for example, by unscrambling phrases containing words such as “high 
paying salary”) led to self-sufficient and self-regarding behavior in terms of wanting less help 
from others, giving less help to others, and preferring distance from others. Further, DeVoe and 
Iyengar (2010) found that subjects rated hypothetical employee performance bonuses that 
rewarded employees unequally as much more fair when the bonus involved money (or 
redeemable reward points) than when it involved time (vacation days) or food. In a field setting, 
Kube, Maréchal and Puppe (2012) demonstrated that workers distinguish between monetary and 
non-monetary gifts from an employer, responding much more positively to the latter. Brown, 
Meer and Williams (2013) showed that people donate more to charity when their work output 
goes directly to charity, as money, than when they receive their work output first and then make 
a monetary donation. Thus, there is considerable reason to believe that people’s inclinations to 
act pro-socially may be weaker in contexts involving money, compared to other kinds of 
decisions. This yields our primary alternative hypothesis. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 A type-based reciprocity model (Levine, 1998) also generates identical predictions whenever the distribution of 
types is not affected by the context. Models of intentions-based reciprocity trivially generate identical predictions for 
the two environments (Rabin, 1993; Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger, 2004).  
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HA: Generosity will be greater in non-monetary contexts than in monetary ones. 
As a second research question, we ask, is there a relationship between an individual’s 
generosity in monetary and non-monetary allocations? Social preference models assume that 
generous behavior in different contexts results from the same underlying mechanisms. For 
example, people who care about equality in one context should care about equality in other 
contexts as well. Therefore, even if H0 is not supported because some feature of the context 
causes changes in levels of generosity, we might expect a relationship between individuals’ 
relative generosity—those who are more generous than others in one context should also be more 
generous in other contexts as well. While, not formulating a formal hypothesis for this research 
question, our analysis explores this important question. 
The questions above are related to other work that attempts to identify relationships 
between pro-social behavior in different contexts.6 For example, Benz and Meier (2008) find that 
Swiss students who make greater donations to charities in a classroom experiment also donate 
more to charities outside of an experimental setting; other studies also find relationships between 
pro-social behavior in experimental and natural environments (e.g., Rustagi, Engel and Kosfeld, 
2010; Carpenter and Seki, 2011; Fehr and Leibbrandt, 2011). Such relationships are sometimes 
present for some behaviors and absent for others. For instance, Carpenter and Myers (2010) find 
that the amount donated to charity in a dictator game is correlated with the willingness to become 
a volunteer firefighter, but not with the propensity to actually respond to emergency calls. Other 
studies similarly find support for such behavioral relationships in some comparisons but not in 
others (Karlan, 2005; Laury and Taylor, 2008), and some studies find very little correspondence 
between pro-social behavior in lab and field settings (Stoop, Noussair and Van Soest, 2012). Of 
course, in making the comparisons between experimental and natural (non-experimental) choice 
environments, various aspects of the choice context may change. For example, as Carpenter and 
Myers (2010) note, in settings such as volunteer firefighting, image-based motivations may be 
present in some types of behaviors more than in others. Or a comparison between public good 
games and the fishing behavior of fishermen may ignore a desire to “win” by catching more real 
fish in the natural context that is not present in decisions outside of that context (Stoop, Noussair 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Also related is research that attempts to identify the relationships between other forms of preferences across choice 
contexts, including risk (Einav, et al., 2012) and time preferences (Chabris, et al., 2008; Meier and Sprenger, 2012). 
	   8 
and Van Soest, 2012). Other factors, such as repeated interaction, incentives and beliefs likely 
regularly vary when comparing laboratory and non-laboratory contexts. 
We adopt a different approach to understand how generosity differs across contexts. Our 
primary goal is not to compare generous behavior in laboratory and “natural” environments, 
between which many things may change (cf. Levitt and List, 2007). Rather, we hold constant the 
laboratory environment, and change as little as possible to identify more precise characteristics 
of a choice context that affect pro-social behavior. Hence, all our measurements are conducted in 
laboratory settings using almost identical instructions and choice procedures, one-shot decisions 
and similar degrees of anonymity between participants. Our goal is to create abstract 
environments in which the valuations over outcomes for both parties are as similar as possible—
i.e., where 𝑣! 𝑠!(𝑔,∆𝑤′),∆𝑤′ = 𝑣! 𝑠!(𝑔,∆𝑤′′),∆𝑤′′ . Also, to avoid the possibility that 
associations with natural contexts creep into our experiments and influence behaviors in 
unintended ways, we employ abstract tasks, dictator games, with little direct correspondence to 
real-world behavior.7  
 
III. Experiment One 
We begin with an experiment that compares generosity in a standard monetary context—
a laboratory dictator game over monetary allocations—to generosity in a similar non-monetary 
setting in which the dictator game allocations are over an uncomfortable experience. 
Specifically, in the experiment, each participant made two allocation decisions: a division of 
money ($6) and a division of a harmful experience (putting one’s hand in ice water for 60 
seconds). We varied the order in which participants made the two decisions. 
 
A. Experimental Design 
Participants from the Pittsburgh community were recruited from the Center for 
Behavioral Decision Research subject pool. Each session had between ten and eighteen 
participants. Participants were randomly assigned sequential ID numbers that were unknown to 
other participants. The ID numbers determined subjects’ roles.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 That is, we could have created richer contexts for the decisions faced by our subjects, by associating some 
environments more closely with “helping a victim” or using terms like “volunteering” or “donations.” Instead, we 
follow Smith (1976) to try to create environments that eliminate such realism for the sake of more precise control 
over valuations. 
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All participants jointly listened to initial instructions, which were read aloud (sample 
instructions are provided in the Appendix). Subjects were told that they would be paid $5 in cash 
at the end of the experiment, and that they might also receive an additional sum of money in cash 
at that time. Participants were informed that they would be split into two rooms, based on 
whether they had an odd or even participant ID number, and that each odd-numbered participant 
(dictator) would make a decision that would affect an even-numbered participant (recipient), but 
that even-numbered participants would not make any choices that affected the odd-numbered 
participants. They were asked not to communicate with others and to raise their hand if they had 
any questions during the experiment. Participants were assured that their choices throughout the 
experiment would be anonymous. Experimenters then took even- and odd-numbered participants 
into separate rooms. Once separated, participants were instructed to read the informed consent 
document carefully. The consent ensured that no participant had any prior medical issues, such 
as frostbite, that would interfere with their participation in the experiment.8  
Dictators completed two main choice tasks: an allocation of $6 (money) and an allocation 
of 60 seconds of ice-water immersion (harm). A research assistant, who was unaware of the 
experimental hypotheses, guided the dictators through the instructions by reading them aloud and 
asking for any questions. Dictators were told that they would make two decisions, and that only 
one would count based on the outcome of a fair coin flip. Dictators first received instructions for 
one of the two tasks—money or harm—made decisions in that context, and then received 
instructions for the other context. Both dictators and recipients received detailed instructions 
describing both of the allocation tasks. 
In the money allocation choice, dictators divided $6.00, in 50-cent increments, between 
themselves and their paired recipients. On the same page as the instructions, dictators wrote the 
amount of money they allocated to the other person, as well as the amount they allocated to 
themselves.9 If the money task was selected at the end of the experiment, then the paired 
recipient was informed about the money shared with him or her by the dictator, and paid this 
amount in cash. The corresponding dictator received the remaining payment in cash privately.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 One participant, upon reading the informed consent, decided to discontinue his participation. This participant, who 
was in the role of dictator, and the participant’s matched receiver are excluded from the data. 
9 The instructions reminded subjects that the two amounts had to sum to $6. If the amounts did not, the specified 
allocation to the other was implemented and the dictator received the remainder. 
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In the harm allocation choice, dictators divided 60 seconds of time spent with a hand 
immersed in ice water, at a temperature of 3-5 degrees Celsius, in 5-second increments. Prior to 
completing this allocation decision, dictators were called one-by-one into a separate room and 
submerged their hand in a bucket of ice water for 5 seconds. They were told that recipients 
would similarly experience a 5-second trial immersion. This was done to ensure familiarity with 
the discomfort of the experience.10 Dictators then privately completed their allocation decisions, 
by specifying the amount of time of ice water immersion they allocated to the other person and 
to themselves. They were informed that if the harm choice were to be selected to count at the end 
of the experiment, the associated dictator and recipient would separately experience the specified 
amount of ice-water immersion determined by the dictator’s allocation choice.  
At the end of the experiment, after making both the allocation decisions for money and 
harm, dictators completed a second-price auction where the lowest bidder in a session received a 
payment (determined by the amount bid by the second-lowest bidder) to immerse his or her hand 
in ice water for 60 seconds. We use the bids in this auction to identify each subject’s valuation, 
measured as the minimum Willingness to Accept (WTA), for the ice-water immersion 
experience and to control for possible heterogeneity in the disutility from this experience. 
In the other room, a different experimenter guided receivers (even-numbered 
participants) through their instructions. Receivers were informed about the two allocation 
decisions being completed by dictators, one at a time. After learning about the harm task, 
receivers experienced 5 seconds of immersing their hand in ice water and then participated in the 
second-price auction to determine their minimum WTA for 60 seconds of ice-water immersion. 
Receivers also provided expectations about the dictators’ allocation decisions, though they were 
not provided any monetary incentives for accuracy. 
 After all of the dictators completed their choices, the second-price auction, and a follow-
up questionnaire, the experimenter flipped a fair coin and allowed each dictator to call the coin in 
the air. Dictators were told ahead of time that if they called it correctly the money allocation 
would count and, otherwise, the harm allocation would be enforced. A record of each dictator’s 
decisions and the result of the coin flip was transferred to the receivers’ room, and the receivers 
were given the allocations of either money or ice-water immersion produced by their paired 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 A study by Mitchell, MacDonald, and Brodie (2004) found the smallest differences in pain tolerance between men 
and women at 3 degrees Celsius. Most men and women rated this experience between a 45 and 90 on a visual analog 
scale ranging from 0 (no discomfort) to 100 (worst discomfort possible).  
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dictators. Dictators were then taken into a separate room, one at a time, to receive their 
allocations. For money allocations, participants were paid immediately in cash. For harm 
allocations, participants submerged their hand into an insulated water cooler containing water 
and ice maintained at a temperature between 3-5 degrees Celsius. Time was calculated using a 
digital stopwatch. In the case of receivers, each individual was shown the result of her assigned 
dictator’s choice and the outcome of the coin flip, and received the requisite allocation in the 
presence of the other receivers so that they could leave quickly. The anonymity of the dictator 
was not compromised by this procedure.  
In total, we collected choices from 108 participants, or 54 dictator-receiver pairs. 
Twenty-six of the dictators (48 percent) were female. Twenty-six of the dictators completed the 
money allocation first, while the remainder completed the harm allocation first.11 
 
B. Results 
 For the analysis below, we transformed each allocation decision made by a dictator into a 
Generosity Index (Gi). For the money allocation, GiM is equal to the proportion of the total 
monetary endowment that was given to the other participant. For the harm allocation, GiH is 
equal to the proportion of the total time of ice-water immersion kept for oneself.  
In contrast with the null hypothesis, dictators were, on average, much more generous in 
their nonmonetary divisions of harm than when dividing money, with mean GiH = 0.48 (SD = 
0.28) and mean GiM = 0.30 (SD = 0.20). This difference is significant in a paired-samples t-test 
for differences in means (t (53) = 4.27, p < 0.0001).  
Figure 1 presents the empirical cumulative distributions of Gi for each condition. The 
proportion of entirely selfish (Gi = 0) behavior is slightly higher for money than for harm (17% 
and 13%, respectively) and the proportion of people distributing the money or harm equally is 
lower for money than for harm (Gi = 0.5, money: 35%, harm: 41%). Overall, there is more 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Prior to conducting this experiment, we ran a small pilot study. Procedures were similar except for small 
differences in methods: each participant was both a receiver and a dictator, participants did not experience the cold 
water before making their allocations, and willingness to accept was not elicited. Twenty-four members (11 females) 
ages 18-61 years (M = 27 years, SD = 10.9 years) of the Pittsburgh community were recruited for this experiment. 
Most of the participants (58%) took more than half of the money for themselves with the remainder splitting the 
money equally. In contrast, a minority (29%) gave the other person more than half of the pain; most (58%) split the 
pain equally; and a few (13%) took more than half of the pain on themselves. The data were consistent with our 
alternative hypothesis: participants were on average more generous in their divisions of time putting one’s hand in 
ice water (M = 0.48, SD = 0.16) compared to their divisions of money (M = 0.34, SD = 0.19).  
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generous behavior in the harm context than for money. Most strikingly, while only one person 
(2%) gave more than half the money, 16 people (30%) kept more than half the harm. 
Figure 2 presents the joint distribution of generosity in the money and harm contexts, by 
subject. The horizontal axis corresponds to possible degrees of generosity in the sharing of harm 
(GiH), while the vertical axis corresponds to generosity in the sharing of money (GiM). The size of 
each marker indicates the number of subjects represented by that data point. The two most 
frequent joint outcomes correspond to subjects dividing equally in both contexts (GiH = GiM = 
0.5, 12 cases or 22%) and to subjects behaving completely selfishly in both contexts (GiH = GiM 
= 0, 6 cases or 11%). Overall, twenty-two subjects (41%) made the same decision both times. 
Among those subjects who changed their behavior across contexts, twenty-five (46%) were more 
generous when allocating harm than money and only seven (13%) were more generous for 
money than harm.12 A chi-square test indicates that this asymmetry in proportions is unlikely 
given a null-hypothesis of equality of distributions (𝜒!(2) = 8.44, p = 0.015). 
Combining the above observations yields our first main finding regarding the relative 
degrees of generosity in monetary allocations and those involving harm: 
Result 1: Dictators are typically more generous when allocating harm than 
when allocating money.  
Thus, consistent with our alternative hypothesis, we find a different pattern of behavior in the 
domain of nonmonetary allocations of harm than in the standard monetary Dictator game. The 
fact that generosity is greater in the allocation of harm is consistent with earlier psychological 
studies, in which people were highly generous in taking on harm. Moreover, this suggests that 
identifying the degree of generosity in monetary domains may not allow a direct extrapolation to 
generosity in other, non-monetary, contexts such as the allocation of harm.  
Of course, one important consideration in interpreting the above result is that we 
assume that participants find immersing one’s hand in ice water unpleasant, rather than 
enjoyable. There are at least three reasons to think that this is, in fact, the case. First, the 
aggregate distributions of choices seem inconsistent with the interpretation that dictators simply 
keep more time because they believe it is enjoyable. For example, only three subjects (6%) keep 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 The fact that 22 of 54 subjects behaved consistently across contexts means that the change in behavior among 
those subjects who do not behave consistently is larger than the aggregate analysis suggests. When looking only at 
this subsample, mean GiH = 0.60 (SD = 0.25) is over twice as high as mean GiM = 0.29 (SD = 0.18). 	  
	   13 
all the time for themselves, which is considerably lower than the proportion of purely selfish 
behavior in the monetary context (9 subjects, or 17%). Moreover, among the 9 subjects who are 
completely selfish in the monetary dictator game 6 (67%) also give all the ice-water time to the 
recipient (see Figure 2), suggesting that this is an appropriate interpretation of self-regarding 
behavior. Second, if dictators believed the ice-water-immersion task to be enjoyable, then we 
would expect them to require zero compensation for the experience. Only two dictators gave 
WTA values of $0 in the second-price auction, and dictators had a mean WTA in dollars for 
immersing their hands in ice water for sixty seconds of $5.91 (SD = 7.92), which differs 
significantly from zero (t (53) = 5.48, p < 0.001), and a median WTA of $4.25.13 Hence, for an 
overwhelming majority of dictators, the experience seems to be aversive. Third, the relationship 
between WTA values and generosity in allocating harm is weak, at best, and does not account for 
the difference in generosity between contexts. Figure 3 shows the relationship between an 
individual dictator’s WTA and that individual’s generosity in the allocation of harm. Participants 
who viewed the ice water experience as more aversive, as indicated by a greater WTA, were only 
slightly less generous in their allocations of harm.14 Thus, most dictators seemed to find the ice-
water-immersion experience aversive and the degree to which they did so had little relationship 
with their decisions of how to allocate harm between themselves and the recipient. 
 To more precisely test for differences between the monetary and harm allocations, we 
conducted the regressions reported in Table 1. In each model, the measured generosity (GiH or 
GiM) is the dependent variable. The primary explanatory variable is whether the allocation 
involved money (0) or harm (1). The first model accounts for individual differences by including 
subject fixed effects. To account for the role of individual characteristics and circumstances in 
generosity, the second model does not include fixed effects, but instead introduces individual-
specific explanatory variables, including the order in which the dictator saw the two choices 
(either money then harm (0) or harm then money (1)), an interaction term between context and 
order, individual-specific controls for gender, age, and valuation of the ice-water immersion 
experience (WTA). Finally, Model 2 also includes the interaction between WTA and harm 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Consistent with earlier research (Mitchell, MacDonald, and Brodie, 2004), we find that men (mean WTA = 4.45, 
SD = 5.24) find the experience less aversive than women (mean WTA = 7.49, SD = 9.80), though this difference is 
not statistically significant (t(52) = 1.42, p = 0.16).. 
14 The OLS coefficient obtained in a regression of GiH on WTA is -0.0072 (s.e. = 0.0047) and is not statistically 
significant (t (52) = 1.52, p = 0.134). The relationship between WTA and GiH is even weaker when we remove the 
one outlier (WTA = $50). In this case, there is a small positive, but statistically insignificant, correlation between 
WTA and GiM.  
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context, to account for the fact that WTA for the harmful experience may partly account for 
allocation behavior in that context. This model also includes robust standard errors, clustered by 
subject. Model 3 replicates Model 2, but excludes the two dictators who provided WTA values 
of $0, perhaps indicating that they did not find the ice-water immersion task aversive. 
 Across Models 1 through 3, we find that generosity is greater in the harm context, and 
that this is robust to order effects and when controlling for individual characteristics. Model 3 
shows that this relationship holds equally strongly using only subjects who require monetary 
compensation for additional time in the ice-water immersion task. While Models 2 and 3 indicate 
that subjects who are willing to accept less for ice-water immersion experience also appear more 
generous, this is driven mainly by the one WTA outlier of $50—Model 4 shows that omitting 
this observation makes the coefficient on the Harm context X WTA interaction term statistically 
insignificant. Thus, this regression analysis supports Result 1. Consistent with the alternative 
hypothesis, subjects appear to be much more generous in the allocation of harm than in 
allocating money, even after accounting for their valuation of harm.  
We now turn to our second research question, which deals with the relationship between 
an individual’s generosities across the two allocation contexts. Figure 2 reveals little apparent 
relationship between a dictator’s allocation of money and harm for most subjects. As we note 
above, only twenty-two “consistent” subjects (41%) made the same decision for harm and 
money. Moreover, the correlation between generosity for harm and money is not statistically 
significant (r = 0.143, t (52) = 1.044, p = 0.301).15 Thus, we have our second main result: 
Result 2: We find no significant relationship between an individual’s generosity 
in allocating harm and money.  
This result suggests that a single social preference cannot account for the majority of individual 
subjects’ behavior in the two contexts. Instead it appears that most subjects approach the two 
decisions differently, in a way that is not easily predicted across domains. 
  
C. Discussion 
Experiment 1 provides evidence that people act more generously in a non-monetary harm 
context than in a standard monetary dictator game. The experiment satisfies many of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 The correlation was also not significant using correlation between ranks: Spearman’s ρ = 0.056, p = 0.69.  
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conditions necessary to conduct a test of generosity across contexts. It uses identical populations 
and choice elicitation procedures for measuring generosity in the two contexts. Moreover, the 
mean WTA for 60 seconds of ice-water immersion provided by all subjects, dictators and 
recipients, is $6.42, which is close to the monetary amount to be allocated in the dictator game 
($6). Hence, on average, subjects find the valuations of relative outcomes comparable in the two 
contexts. Moreover, there is no significant difference in the valuations of dictators and 
recipients—the mean WTA for dictators is $5.91 (SD = 7.92) and for receivers it is $6.93 (SD = 
10.50).16 While there is heterogeneity in how much dictators dislike the ice-water immersion 
task, the regression analysis shows that this cannot account for the differences in generosity. 
However, the test in Experiment 1 is not perfect, in that there are other possible 
interpretations for the differences in behavior. For starters, the comparison is between one highly 
familiar allocation medium (money) and a highly unfamiliar one (ice-water immersion). In 
addition, this comparison changes two things at once, by comparing a positive monetary 
endowment (∆𝑤 > 0) with a negative non-monetary one (∆𝑤 < 0). Moreover, even if dictator’s 
monetary valuations for 60 seconds of ice-water immersion do not explain the behavioral 
difference, non-linearity in how dictators value, or expect to value, different segments of the total 
60-second allocation might nevertheless explain some change in behavior. For example, dictators 
may believe that the first 30 seconds are much easier to bear than the second 30-second interval. 
Additionally, even if dictators’ own valuations do not account for the behavioral change, their 
beliefs about how much recipients dislike the task may be important.  Hence, a more appropriate 
comparison should attempt to compare monetary and non-monetary contexts that utilize 
similarly familiar reward media, hold constant whether the allocation is a gain or a loss, and use 
allocations more commonly known to be comparable in value and that generally have linear 
valuation in terms of each other. 
  
IV. Experiment Two 
Our second experiment extends the design of Experiment 1 to determine the robustness 
of our findings, to provide a comparison that holds more features of the two contexts constant, 
and also to obtain a better understanding of what elements of the money-versus-harm allocation 
contexts drive the differences in observed generosity. In particular, we separate the effects of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 The 95% confidence interval for the difference in means includes zero (t (106) = 0.57, p = 0.57). 
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monetary versus non-monetary allocations from the effects of allocating welfare gains versus 
losses. To test robustness, we use a different subject population, employ slightly different 
procedures and, most importantly, use a different medium in the non-monetary context. To hold 
important factors constant, we use a non-monetary medium, time, that is familiar to subjects, that 
shares many properties with money, and for which conversions into money are often linear. We 
also elicit more precise measures of individual valuations and beliefs about others’ valuations.  
 
A. Experimental Design 
Experiment 2 includes the kinds of allocation choices from Experiment 1—money versus 
harm—but also extends the studied contexts in a 2 X 2 design that independently varies two 
features of the context. The first feature involves varying whether the allocation is monetary or 
non-monetary, while the second involves whether the allocation involves a positive or negative 
change to subjects’ initial endowments.  
We conducted the experiment using a different population, in Zurich, Switzerland. 
Subjects began the experiment with an initial monetary endowment of 45 Swiss Francs (CHF). 
They also began with the requirement that, at the end of the experiment, they would have to 
spend 30 minutes of waiting time, sitting in an isolated booth, performing a tedious, repetitive 
task on a computer.  
Through the dictator allocation choices, subjects’ wealth and waiting time could increase 
or decrease. More precisely, we considered four contexts in which dictators allocated either a 
gain or a loss from the initial endowments: 
• In the Monetary-Positive (M+) allocation, dictators allocated a gain of CHF 20, in CHF 1 
increments, between themselves and their paired recipients. 
• In the Monetary-Negative (M-) allocation, dictators allocated a loss of CHF 20, in CHF 1 
increments. The principal difference between these first two treatments, therefore, dealt 
with whether the units allocated increased or decreased subjects’ earnings beyond the 
CHF 45 initial wealth. 
• In the Non-monetary-Positive (NM+) allocation, dictators decided how to divide a total 
of 20 minutes of gained free time between themselves and their paired receiver in 1-
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minute increments.17 This gained free time reduced the initial 30-minute waiting time 
period.  
• In the Non-monetary-Negative (NM-) allocation, which is the most comparable to the 
harm condition from Experiment 1, dictators decided how to divide a total of 20 minutes 
of additional waiting time between themselves and their paired receiver in 1-minute 
increments. This additional waiting time increased the initial 30-minute waiting time 
period. 
Each dictator made all four of the above allocation decisions, the order of which was 
counterbalanced by session. Specifically, each dictator saw, first, either the two monetary or non-
monetary allocations, with the order of positive and negative counterbalanced in half the 
sessions. Then, dictators saw the two other types of monetary or non-monetary allocations, again 
with positive and negative counterbalanced. More precisely, there were four treatment orders: M-
/M+/NM-/NM+, M+/M-/NM+/NM-, NM-/NM+/M-/M+, and NM+/NM-/M+/M-, which varied 
by session.  
Subjects were told that at the end of the experiment, one of the four allocation decisions 
for each dictator-receiver pair would be randomly chosen (with equal probability) and fully 
executed by the experimenter. That is, for each pair, the pair’s wealth would either increase (M+) 
or decrease (M-), or their waiting time would increase (NM-) or decrease (NM+) according to the 
allocations specified by the dictator. Participants knew that each dictator would make decisions 
that would affect himself and his assigned receiver but that receivers would not make any 
choices that affected any dictator.18 Participants were assured that their decisions throughout the 
experiment would be kept anonymous.  
After making all allocation choices, dictators and receivers completed second-price 
sealed-bid auctions to elicit their minimum WTAs for different additional amounts of waiting 
time. Specifically, each subject had to submit a bid for each of four additional waiting time 
amounts—of 5, 10, 15 and 20 minutes. In each session, we conducted separate auctions among 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 We established a CHF 1 to 1-minute mapping across the contexts based on the results of a pilot session, in which 
subjects stated their willingness to accept additional increments of time spent performing the waiting task in 
exchange for money, in a second-price auction. The results showed an approximate average conversion of 1 to 1. 
The usual hourly payment for active participation in experiments is approximately CHF 25-30 for this subject pool. 
The higher monetary equivalent for time spent performing this particular task likely reflects its highly boring and 
tedious nature.  
18 While dictators made each allocation decision, receivers reported what they believed their paired dictator would 
allocate. Their guesses did not affect outcomes for them or any dictators and were therefore not incentivized.	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dictators and receivers, so they could not affect one another through their bids. When participants 
stated their WTAs for spending additional amounts of waiting time, they were not yet informed 
of any choices or outcomes from the dictator games. Thus, they did not know which decision 
was selected to count, how long they would wait at the end of the experiment, nor how much 
their payoff would be. Within each group—dictators or receivers—one of the four additional 
waiting times was randomly selected, and the participant who bid the most for that waiting time 
was paid the second-highest bid and had the selected time added to his or her waiting time at the 
end of the experiment.  
We then asked participants to guess the median bids, for each of the four possible 
amounts of additional waiting time, entered by the other group—i.e., dictators guessed the 
median bids for receivers, and vice versa. Thereafter, the computer randomly selected one of the 
amounts, calculated the median bid for each group, and participants received an additional CHF 
2 if their guess was within +/- 1.0 of the actual median for the other group. These bids and 
estimates provide us with information on subjects’ valuations of different increments of waiting 
time, and of their beliefs of other subjects’ valuations.  
Finally, participants answered several socio-demographic questions and were then 
informed by their computer screen of the outcomes for the selected dictator game and auctions. 
The screen showed them their total accumulated earnings and waiting time. 
At the end of the experiment, we executed the waiting time phase. We did not want 
subjects to learn when other subjects left the experiment, since this would provide information 
on dictators’ allocations. Therefore, during the waiting time, all participants were required to 
wear headphones, which played sounds like rainfall and white noise. They were also seated in 
cubicles that were surrounded on three sides by partition walls and on the fourth side by a dark 
curtain. This meant that they could neither detect when someone else was leaving the 
experiment, nor could they observe which cubicles were empty as they left. The experimenter 
collected participants’ personal possessions and phones upon arrival and subjects had no access 
to the internet at any point in the experiment. During the waiting time, subjects saw a blank 
screen. Every 20 seconds, a button appeared somewhere on the screen and the subject had to 
click on the button within 10 seconds in order for the timer to count down that 30-second 
interval. Otherwise, a warning message appeared telling the subject that the waiting time had not 
decreased. Once a subject’s waiting time expired, the experimenter came to that subject’s 
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cubicle, handed the subject his or her belongings, led the subject out of the laboratory, and 
privately paid the subject.  
To give participants experience with the precise task to be performed during the waiting 
time, all participants experienced one minute of the waiting time activity at the beginning of the 
experiment. At this point, subjects were given the option of leaving the experiment if they were 
not willing to perform this activity for longer periods at the end of the experiment. 
We recruited a total of 188 participants from the subject pool of the University of Zurich 
and the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich. We ran a total of eight sessions, two of 
each choice order, with 22 to 24 participants each. At the beginning of each session and before 
entering the laboratory, participants drew a random number, which directed them to a private 
cubicle in the laboratory. Participants entered privately, one at a time, placed their possessions in 
a bag that they handed to the experimenter, and then entered their curtained cubicle. They 
remained in their private cubicle for the whole experiment. All instructions were displayed to the 
participants on their computer screen and broadcast via the audio system in the laboratory.19 
Instructions were read for each decision separately (see Appendix). Fifty-three of the dictators 
(56%) and fifty of the receivers (53%) were male. Participants came from a wide area of 
academic disciplines. The mean age was 23.1 years, ranging from 18 to 44 years.  
 
B. Results 
Following the analysis in Experiment 1, we transformed the allocation decisions made by 
each dictator into four Generosity Indices (Gi): Monetary-Positive (𝐺!!!), Monetary-Negative 
(𝐺!!!), Non-monetary-Positive (𝐺!!"!), and Non-monetary-Negative (𝐺!!"!). Figure 4 shows 
the cumulative empirical distributions for generosity in each context. Table 2 provides summary 
statistics of the degree of generosity across different contexts. 
We again see that generosity varies across contexts. Consistent with Experiment 1, 
generosity is greater in the allocation of harm than in the allocation of positive wealth changes 
(𝐺!!"! > 𝐺!!!). The difference in means (0.10) is smaller than in Experiment 1 but still 
statistically significant (t(93) = 3.54, p = 0.001). Moreover, while only 29 percent of subjects 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Our design thus creates a Highly Replicable Laboratory Environment (Bartling, Engl & Weber, 2014), in which 
subjects receive identical instructions (on the screen and via pre-recorded audio files) across sessions. This also 
facilitates direct replication by other researchers. 
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exhibited generosity of at least 0.5 when making a positive monetary allocation, 44 percent did 
so when allocating harm.  
The results of Experiment 2 also indicate that the main factor responsible for the 
difference in generosity between monetary gains and non-monetary harm is the monetary versus 
non-monetary dimension, rather than whether the allocation involves a gain or a loss. Subjects 
are more generous in both non-monetary domains, where mean generosity across positive and 
negative allocations (𝐺!!" = 0.35), is higher than in the positive and negative allocation of 
money (𝐺!! = 0.24). However, there is little difference in generosity within the monetary and 
non-monetary contexts, based on whether the allocation involves a gain or a loss relative to the 
status quo. 
Table 3 reports regressions that explore how generosity changes across contexts. The 
dependent variable is the generosity exhibited in a particular context, and the first two 
explanatory variables identify each of the treatment dimensions, relative to the omitted context, 
Monetary-Positive, and the third explanatory variable measures the interaction between these 
treatment variables. Model 1 accounts for individual differences through subject-specific fixed 
effects, while the remaining models do so through controls and clustered standard errors. Across 
all models, the effect of non-monetary context is positive and statistically significant, indicating 
that subjects are more generous in non-monetary contexts than in monetary ones. The 
coefficients for the Negative frame and for the interaction term are smaller and never statistically 
significant, indicating that the positive vs. negative distinction has little effect on behavior.20  
Looking at individual behavior, twenty-four of the 94 dictators exhibited identical 
generosity across all four contexts. Nine of these subjects allocated equitably across all decisions 
(𝐺! = 0.5), while seven behaved entirely selfishly (𝐺! = 0.0).21 Thus, as in Experiment 1, an 
overwhelming majority of subjects who were consistent were either entirely egalitarian or 
selfish. Also as in Experiment 1, among those subjects who were inconsistent, more subjects, 26 
(37%), were always more generous in non-monetary contexts than in monetary ones, relative to 9 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 To test the difference in generosity between the positive monetary allocation (GM+) and the allocation of harm 
(GNM-), reflecting the comparison in Experiment 1, we test the restriction that the first three coefficients in Model 1 
sum to zero. This restriction is rejected (F(3,278) = 13.79, p = 0.000).  
21 Of the remaining eight subjects, seven consistently allocated amounts between 𝐺! = 0.05 and 𝐺! = 0.4 and the 
remaining subject always acted very generously (𝐺! = 0.95). 
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(13%) who were always more generous in monetary contexts. The higher frequency of the 
former category is unlikely to result from chance (z = 2.87, p  < 0.01).  
Model 2 adds a variable, Order, which measures the position within a session during 
which a particular choice was faced. This has a negative and statistically significant coefficient. 
That is, generosity appears to decrease over the course of a session.22 While the coefficient for 
non-monetary is nevertheless statistically significant in this regression, even when controlling for 
order, there is still the possibility that order effects somehow drive the main results. To address 
this possibility, we consider the degrees of generosity exhibited in the first decision confronted 
by a subject, before that subject has familiarity with any of the other allocation contexts. In this 
between-subjects comparison, we observe a similar pattern to that above—subjects are more 
generous in the non-monetary choice contexts than in the monetary ones (GM+ = 0.30; GM- = 
0.20; GNM+ = 0.39; GNM- = 0.44), with the aggregate monetary versus non-monetary comparison 
being significant  (GM = 0.25; GNM = 0.41; t(92) = 3.73, p < 0.001). 
Models 3 through 5 replace subject fixed effects with subject random effects and control 
for individual characteristics. Specifically, we include gender, age, whether the subject reports 
having donated money in the past year, a binary variable indicating whether the subjects’ self-
reported wealth is above or below the median of all subjects, a binary variable indicating whether 
the subject knew any other subjects in the session, and a binary variable indicating the subject 
attends religious service. The coefficients for these variables indicate that older subjects and 
subjects who reported making charitable donations exhibit greater generosity. 
In Model 4, we add a measure of the personal disutility from waiting time. Specifically, 
we include the subjects’ stated willingness to accept for 20 minutes of additional waiting time at 
the end of the experiment, elicited in an incentive-compatible second-price auction. We also 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Looking more closely at the data, it appears that there is an interesting potential explanation for this relationship. 
The effect of Order is largely confined to the nonmonetary contexts, with subjects who encounter non-monetary 
decisions in the first half of the experiment acting much more generously (𝐺!!" = 0.42) than subjects who make 
nonmonetary decisions in the second half of the experiment (𝐺!!" = 0.27), after they have experienced monetary 
allocation contexts. While both of these are higher than the generosity in monetary contexts in both the first half 
(𝐺!! = 0.23) and second half (𝐺!!" = 0.25) of the experiment, the difference for the second half is quite small, and 
statistically insignificant. Looking even more closely, it seems that the big change in behavior for the non-monetary 
contexts occurs between the second (𝐺!!" = 0.43) and third (𝐺!!" = 0.29) decisions. Recall, from our design, that 
subjects making non-monetary decisions as their second decision had not yet made any monetary decisions, while 
subjects making non-monetary decisions as their third decision had seen both monetary decisions. Therefore, a 
speculative interpretation of this finding is that the lower generosity exhibited in the monetary context spills over 
into the non-monetary decisions, but not vice versa. Of course, these observations are entirely post hoc and should 
be interpreted cautiously. However, they are consistent with research we reviewed earlier indicating that priming 
people to think of money changes their social behavior in non-monetary contexts (Vohs, Mead and Goode, 2006). 
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include the interaction of this variable with non-monetary context, to see if it accounts for 
behavior in one context more than in the other. Subjects who provide higher WTA values—
indicating a greater disutility from the waiting time in terms of money—are less generous. While 
statistically significant, the coefficient is small. Moreover, this does not explain behavior 
significantly better in the non-monetary context, nor does it reduce the significance of the non-
monetary treatment effect.23 Finally, in Model 5 we add as an explanatory variable how much 
compensation dictators thought the median receiver would require for 20 minutes of additional 
waiting time. This also does not account for the non-monetary treatment effect, indicating that it 
is not dictators’ beliefs about how unpleasant receivers would find the waiting time experience 
that explains the change in generosity across contexts. 
Result 3: Dictators are typically more generous in non-monetary allocations 
than in monetary allocations. 
As we note earlier, the quality of our design depends on some important assumptions 
regarding the valuation of the non-monetary allocation context relative to the value of money. 
First, it is necessary that dictators perceive the additional waiting time as unpleasant, otherwise 
they might appear to act “generously” when, in fact, they are taking on more waiting time 
because they (expect to) enjoy it. In fact, every dictator gave at least one WTA value higher than 
CHF 0 for at least one of the four possible additional waiting time amounts, and 92 of 94 
dictators (98 percent) indicated a positive WTA value for all possible time intervals. Hence, on 
average, dictators require additional compensation for waiting time. Table 4 summarizes the 
mean and median marginal WTA values provided by dictators for the different possible 
additional waiting time intervals. Specifically, for each time interval, we subtracted the WTA 
value provided by a subject in the second-price auction from the value for the previous interval. 
The values tend to be large and positive, again indicating that subjects perceived waiting time as 
unpleasant.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 In additional regressions, not reported here, we also included variables for the marginal willingness to accept for 
each additional 5-minute interval—e.g., the marginal increase in WTA for 0 to 5 minutes, 5 to 10 minutes, 10 to 15 
minutes and 15 to 20 minutes. We include these variables both separately and jointly. While they vary in their 
significance, they do not substantively change the magnitude or statistical significance of the non-monetary 
treatment variable. We also elicited a qualitative self-report measure of how unpleasant subjects believed the waiting 
time experience would be. This variable does not predict generosity—neither on aggregate nor in the non-monetary 
condition-and its inclusion does not change the other results. 
	   23 
Second, for direct comparability between the monetary dictator game and the non-
monetary allocation context, it is desirable that the relationship between money and waiting time 
be fairly linear. Table 4 shows that the relationship between marginal WTA for each additional 
5-minute waiting time interval is fairly constant, and close to a one-to-one relationship. For 
example, the median WTA values for every time interval are very close to 5. Model 1 in Table 5 
presents a regression of the dictators’ marginal WTA values on time interval (e.g., on column in 
Table 4). The time interval coefficient is statistically indistinguishable from zero. Moreover, the 
constant does not statistically differ significantly from five. That is, we fail to reject that all 
marginal WTA values for 5-minute intervals equal 5 CHF. Therefore, we conclude that our 
design did a fairly good job of producing two contexts in which dictators perceive the valuation 
to be fairly linear and close to one-to-one. 
Third, it is also necessary for dictators to believe that receivers also find the waiting time 
unpleasant. Recall that dictators also predicted the median WTA values provided by receivers, 
with incentives for accuracy. No dictator ever guessed a value of zero for any of the WTA 
estimates, indicating that they always believed the median receiver would require compensation 
for waiting time. The final row of Table 4 presents the mean marginal WTA estimated form 
these guesses, for each additional 5-minute time interval. This row shows values that are, again, 
far from zero and generally close to 5. Model 2 in Table 5 estimates whether there is a significant 
trend in these value estimates, again finding both a statistically insignificant time trend and a 
constant statistically indistinguishable from 5. Hence, it appears that dictators, on average, 
believe receivers also have linear valuations that are close to one-to-one. 
One more observation from Table 4 is worth mentioning. Note that, where the dictators’ 
WTA values and their estimates of the receivers’ WTA differs, it tends to be that dictators 
perceive receivers to place lower cost on waiting time, relative to the value of money, than 
dictators themselves. Thus, this goes against the notion that dictators are more generous in the 
non-monetary context because they believe receivers suffer more from additional waiting time. 
Finally, we consider the additional question of whether one can predict a subject’s 
generosity in one context by her behavior in another. Figure 5 shows the pairwise distributions of 
measured generosity across all treatment combinations in our experiment. Visual inspection 
suggests more observations along the 45-degree diagonal when comparing the two non-monetary 
allocation contexts than in most other cells. Table 6 presents the correlations between observed 
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degrees of generosity in the four contexts. Consistent with our observation from Figure 5, the 
correlation is very large and statistically significant for the gain and loss allocation decisions in 
the non-monetary context. Moreover, the two allocation decisions within the monetary contexts 
are also significantly positively related. Thus, one can predict how well an individual will share 
in one (non-)monetary context by how much that individual shares in another (non-)monetary 
context. The remaining four correlations are statistically significant, but roughly half as large. 
Thus, when predicting generosity across contexts, the explanatory power is lower when the 
monetary vs. non-monetary nature of the context changes.  
Recall that 24 of the 94 dictators never change their behavior across any of the four 
contexts. To study the extent to which the positive correlations in the top panel of Table 6 are 
driven by subjects who never change their behavior, the second panel considers only those 
subjects who were inconsistent in their generosity at least once. That is, given that a subject 
exhibited different generosity in at least two different contexts, how well does generosity in one 
context predict behavior in other contexts. The correlations within monetary and non-monetary 
contexts are again positive and statistically significant. But, the relationship is much weaker in 
both magnitude and statistical significance when comparing across monetary and non-monetary 
contexts, with correlations always positive but never exceeding 0.20. Hence, among those 
subjects who change their behavior, there is little ability to explain how much they share in a 
monetary context based on how much they share in a non-monetary context. 
To get a better sense of how individual choices varied across contexts, we conducted 
exploratory analyses of co-variation in choices in two ways. First, we conducted a principal 
components analysis of the four generosity measures. We retained the two factors that explained 
the greatest variance, which jointly account for 89 percent of the variance. Each of these factors 
has an eigenvalue of at least 0.98. As seen in Table 7, these two factors roughly correspond to 
monetary and non-monetary allocations. Thus, a simple division of behavior in the four contexts 
we study, into monetary and non-monetary contexts, explains a great deal of the observed 
variation in behavior. 
We also examined the relationship between the participants’ four decisions using cluster 
analysis. This approach attempts to determine whether there exist different patterns of decisions 
across the four contexts that cannot be captured purely by linear regression. We employed k-
means clustering in Stata. We allowed for both three clusters (k=3) and four (k=4). In both cases, 
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the distribution of subjects is roughly evenly divided across the clusters. Figures 6 shows the 
mean amount of generosity, in each context, for subjects classified into a particular cluster. In 
both panels, Cluster 1 corresponds to subjects who dramatically change their behavior across 
monetary and non-monetary contexts, acting much more generously in the latter. These subjects 
comprise 20 to 30 percent of the sample and appear to be the primary drivers of our main results. 
The subjects in the remaining clusters are generally stable in their degree of generosity across 
contexts, but vary in how generous they were. Hence, consistent with our earlier analyses of 
consistent and inconsistent subjects, we observe heterogeneous subject behavior—many subjects 
do not systematically change their behavior across contexts. But, those who change their 
behavior do so quite dramatically. 
 
V. Discussion  
Economists have devoted considerable attention to studying generosity in monetary 
allocations. However, notwithstanding the importance and prevalence of other-regarding 
behavior in individuals’ decisions regarding non-monetary allocations, often in the allocation of 
harm, there is a surprising paucity of carefully controlled economic studies in this domain.  
Here, we explored this topic by extending the existing experimental dictator-game 
paradigm into this understudied realm. The reliance on this workhorse of experimental 
economics allows us to explore allocation decisions across contexts in a controlled and well-
understood framework. It also allows us to calibrate our results to earlier work, demonstrating 
that the generosity observed in our monetary contexts is similar to that found in previous 
laboratory research (Camerer, 2003, Chapter 2; Engel, 2011; Cooper and Kagel, forthcoming) 
While allocations of money were similar to what has been observed in the literature, we 
found generosity to be considerably higher in non-monetary contexts. Participants in Experiment 
1 were substantially more generous when allocating harm compared to money. Experiment 2 
more carefully controls for familiarity and valuations across contexts, and again finds that 
allocations in non-monetary contexts are significantly higher. Pooling data across both 
experiments, we estimate a mean generosity that is over 50 percent higher in non-monetary 
(𝐺!!" = 0.40) than monetary (𝐺!! = 0.26) contexts. 
 The observation that individuals are relatively generous when allocating non-monetary 
harm is consistent with related psychological experiments measuring generosity in different 
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domains (Batson, et al., 1988; Schaller and Cialdini, 1988). However, these prior studies are not 
directly comparable to the large literature on monetary allocations using the dictator game, and 
have large methodological differences. Our study demonstrates high generosity in non-monetary 
allocation decisions using the types of controlled, abstract environments employed in 
experimental economics. In making comparisons of behavior across contexts, we keep basic 
choices as similar and comparable as possible, varying little else beyond the medium in which 
the allocation is being made. We also employ a within-subjects design, to make comparisons 
across contexts even more direct.  
Importantly, our main result also addresses the argument that standard monetary dictator 
games may overstate the degree of generosity outside the laboratory (Levitt and List, 2007). This 
conclusion is suggested by experiments that change features of the dictator game to yield less 
generosity (Cherry, Frykblom and Shogren, 2002; List, 2007). In contrast, we find that a version 
of the dictator game that changes the resource allocated yields considerably higher generosity. 
This suggests that the vast literature on dictator games using monetary allocations may 
underestimate the degree of generosity in some naturally occurring contexts. 
 Our data also reveal that the link between a given individual’s generosity across domains 
is somewhat weak. A minority of participants have perfectly consistent preferences across 
contexts. For example, in Experiment 1, 41 percent of subjects exhibited perfect consistency 
between the two decisions, while in Experiment 2, 26 percent did so. However, for those subjects 
whose behavior changes across contexts, the relationship is very small when one compares 
monetary and non-monetary contexts. Hence, the idea of a social preference type—whereby a 
subject displays similar degrees of generosity across different, but comparable, contexts—may 
only partially account for individuals’ tendencies to act generously. In particular, some 
individuals may change their behavior across contexts in a manner that is difficult to explain 
with a single social preference function. 
What do these results mean for theories of social preferences? At one extreme, 
researchers have attempted to model all social preferences under a single parametric model, 
meaning different contexts can be exactly equated given a few individual-specific but context-
independent parameters. That is, under this approach, there is a single social preference for each 
person, and all other-regarding decisions for this person are predictable once this preference 
structure is known. The evidence above suggests that this approach may have limited descriptive 
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value across contexts. At the opposite extreme, if each participant’s behavior in one context 
provides no information about behavior in other contexts, one worries that researchers might 
have to create a unique model for each individual for each context. In between these two 
extremes, perhaps behavior in one context provides partial information about behavior in other 
contexts. Such a model that includes some characteristics of the individual, as well as features of 
the context, might prove valuable in accounting for our results, and other results demonstrating 
instability in pro-social behavior (Krupka and Weber, 2013). 
 
VI. Conclusion 
We observe individuals’ interpersonal allocation choices across different contexts. We 
find that generosity varies substantially across these contexts, with individuals behaving 
considerably more generously in non-monetary contexts, including the allocation of harm, than 
in those involving money. We also find that an individual’s generosity is often difficult to predict 
across contexts, particularly with generosity in monetary contexts sometimes having little 
predictive power for generosity in non-monetary contexts.  
Our results present a challenge for the theoretical literature on pro-social preferences. 
Much of economic theory relies on the presumption that a single, well-specified preference 
function should be able to capture behavior across large swaths of choices. Here, we observed 
individuals who made selfish choices in the monetary domain choosing to be rather generous in 
the non-monetary domain. Such behavior is not easily captured by a single, traditional preference 
function for altruism or equality, nor does it naturally arise in the various modified preference 
functions that have been suggested in the study of pro-social behavior. 
Over the past few decades, economists have built up a solid theoretical, empirical, and 
experimental understanding of how people make choices in the context of monetary goods. 
However, as we seek to understand more and more of our social world, we need to account for 
behavior in a variety of contexts, including those that vary in the monetary versus non-monetary 
consequences of individuals’ actions. The work here suggests that our understanding of behavior 
in the former kind of context, while quite useful in and of itself, may not easily account for 
behavior arising in other contexts. Given the ubiquity and importance of choices that occur in 
these alternative contexts, further developing a useful theoretical and empirical understanding 
seems warranted.   
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Table 1. Regressions of Generosity on Allocation Context (Experiment 1)	  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 All subjects All subjects WTA > $0 WTA < $50 
Harm context 0.184
*** 
(0.043) 
0.223*** 
(0.063) 
0.215*** 
(0.064) 
0.210*** 
(0.074) 
Order of choices  
(harm then money)  
-0.062 
(0.053) 
-0.052 
(0.055) 
-0.061 
(0.053) 
Harm context  
X Order of choices  
0.068 
(0.086) 
0.036 
(0.085) 
0.071 
(0.085) 
Female  0.025 (0.053) 
0.029 
(0.053) 
0.025 
(0.052) 
Age  0.005 (0.003) 
0.004 
(0.004) 
0.006** 
(0.003) 
WTA  0.002 (0.004) 
0.002 
(0.005) 
0.003 
(0.006) 
Harm context X WTA  -0.013
*** 
(0.004) 
-0.011** 
(0.004) 
-0.010 
(0.009) 
Constant 0.299
*** 
(0.030) 
0.174* 
(0.097) 
0.191* 
(0.104) 
0.158* 
(0.085) 
R2 0.624 0.193 0.161 0.185 
Observations (subjects) 108 (54) 
108 
(54) 
104 
(52) 
106 
(53) 
 
Dependent variable is measured generosity (GiH or GiM). Model 1 includes subject-specific fixed effects; 
Models 2 and 3 include subject-specific random effects and robust standard errors, clustered by subject. 
Model 3 excludes the one subject who provided a WTA of $50; Model 4 additional excludes subjects who 
provided WTA of $0. * - p < 0.1, ** - p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 2. Summary statistics for generosity by context (Experiment 2) 
 
 𝐺!!! 𝐺!!! 𝐺!!"! 𝐺!!"! 
Mean 0.25 0.23 0.34 0.35 
Median 0.25 0.25 0.35 0.40 𝐺! = 0 22% 24% 16% 15% 𝐺! = 0.5 28% 20% 30% 34% 𝐺! > 0.5 1% 3% 10% 10% 
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Table 3. Regressions of Generosity on Allocation Context (Experiment 2) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Non-monetary 0.089
*** 
(0.022) 
0.089*** 
(0.021) 
0.089*** 
(0.023) 
0.112*** 
(0.034) 
0.078** 
(0.037) 
Negative -0.021 (0.024) 
-0.021 
(0.023) 
-0.021 
(0.017) 
-0.021 
(0.017) 
-0.021 
(0.017) 
Non-monetary X 
Negative 
0.026 
(0.033) 
0.026 
(0.032) 
0.026 
(0.020) 
0.026 
(0.020) 
0.026 
(0.020) 
Order (position of 
allocation choice)  
-0.029*** 
(0.007) 
-0.029*** 
(0.009) 
-0.027*** 
(0.009) 
-0.028*** 
(0.009) 
WTA20 min    
-0.002** 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
WTA20 min  
X Non-monetary    
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.003* 
(0.002) 
Belief WTA20 min     
-0.002 
(0.002) 
Belief WTA20 min  
X Non-monetary     
0.004* 
(0.002) 
Female   0.034 (0.040) 
0.058 
(0.038) 
0.058 
(0.038) 
Age   0.007
** 
(0.004) 
0.009*** 
(0.003) 
0.009*** 
(0.003) 
Donated to charity   0.084
** 
(0.042) 
0.086** 
(0.040) 
0.086** 
(0.041) 
Wealth   -0.005 (0.043) 
0.000 
(0.043) 
0.000 
(0.043) 
Familiar with other 
participants   
0.028 
(0.040) 
0.056 
(0.040) 
0.056 
(0.039) 
Attended religious 
services   
0.055 
(0.039) 
0.055 
(0.036) 
0.055 
(0.037) 
Constant 0.254
*** 
(0.016) 
0.327*** 
(0.024) 
0.035 
(0.102) 
0.024 
(0.093) 
0.044 
(0.092) 
R2 0.656 0.676 0.139 0.179 0.185 
Observations 376 376 376 376 376 
(Subjects) 94 94 94 94 94 
Dependent variable is measured generosity (GiM+, GiM-, GiNM+, or GiNM-). Models 1 and 2 include subject-
specific fixed effects; Models 3 through 5 include subject-specific random effects and robust standard errors, 
clustered by subject. Donated to charity indicates making any donation to charity in the past year. Wealth 
indicates an above median response to the amount of money available for spending each month. Familiar with 
other participants indicates reporting knowing at least one other person in the session. Attended religious 
services indicates attending religious services in the past year. * - p < 0.1, ** - p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 4. Marginal required compensation for additional waiting time periods (responses by 
dictators) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5. Regressions WTA and WTA estimates on time interval 
 (1) (2) 
 Dictators’ marginal WTA 
Dictators’ estimates 
of receivers’ WTA 
Time interval -0.164 (0.043) 
-0.282 
(0.234) 
Constant  6.286
*** 
(1.088) 
5.306*** 
(0.584) 
R2 0.001 0.009 
Observations (subjects) 376 (94) 
376 
(94) 
 
Dependent variable is the marginal WTA for each additional 5-minute increase in 
waiting time. Time interval is coded 1, 2, 3, 4 to identify the marginal WTA for 0-5, 5-
10, 10-15 and 15-20 minutes, respectively. Both models include robust standard 
errors, clustered by subject. * - p < 0.1, ** - p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
 
  
 
0-5 min. 5-10 min. 10-15 min. 15-20 min. 
Mean WTA (dictators) 7.21  (1.29) 
4.53 
(0.51) 
5.40 
(0.54) 
6.38 
(0.66) 
Median WTA (dictators) 4.98 4.65 5.00 5.00 
Mean guess of receivers’ 
median WTA  
5.77 
 (0.78) 
3.79 
(0.25) 
4.12 
(0.24) 
4.72 
(0.34) 
Standard errors in parentheses 
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Table 6. Correlations in generosity across contexts 
All dictators (n=94) 
 𝐺!!! 𝐺!!! 𝐺!!"! 𝐺!!"! 𝐺!!! 1    𝐺!!! 0.70*** 1   𝐺!!"! 0.48*** 0.36*** 1  𝐺!!"! 0.37*** 0.36*** 0.84*** 1 
     
Inconsistent subjects only (n=70) 
 𝐺!!! 𝐺!!! 𝐺!!"! 𝐺!!"! 𝐺!!! 1    𝐺!!! 0.49*** 1   𝐺!!"! 0.20* 0.05 1  𝐺!!"! 0.05 0.07 0.76*** 1 
 
Inconsistent subject are those for whom the measured generosity differs 
between at least two contexts.  * - p < 0.1, ** - p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
 
Table 7. Principal components analysis of the four allocation decisions 
 
 Component 1 Component 2 
GM+ 0.039 0.686 
GM- -0.036 0.726 
GNM+ 0.694 0.029 
GNM- 0.718 -0.029 
Proportion of Variance 0.46 0.43 
Cumulative Proportion 0.46 0.89 
 
Orthogonal varimax rotation employed to facilitate interpretation of 
factors 
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Figure 1. Cumulative distribution of generosity by context (Experiment 1) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Joint distribution of generosity in harm and money by subject (Experiment 1) 
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Figure 3. Scatter plot and linear correlation between dictators’ Willingness to Accept money to 
put their hand in ice water for sixty seconds (x-axis) and the percent of time kept in the 
allocation of the ice-water experience (y-axis) (GiH). 
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Figure 4. Cumulative distribution of generosity by context (Experiment 2) 
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Figure 5. Pairwise distributions of generosity across contexts (Experiment 2) 
 
 
For the lower triangle, the x-axis for the graph is the variable above the graph and the y-axis is the variable to the 
right of the graph. For the upper triangle, the x-axis for the graph is the variable below the graph and the y-axis is 
the variable to the left of the graph.  
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Figure 6A. Mean generosity exhibited by participants in each cluster, by context (k = 3). 
  
 
 
Figure 6B. Mean generosity exhibited by participants in each cluster, by context (k = 4). 
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